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The phrases "family farming"  and "the family  farm"  rank among  the
most powerful in the agricultural  literature.  This arises  from their
capacity to evoke images of a structure  of agriculture  that combine both
economic and social dimensions.  One consequence  is  an ambiguity in the
use of  the concepts  that fosters  confusion.  This  is  unfortunate, and
avoidable.  The definition of a family  farm can be  stated quite
explicitly, and in a form that permits  quantitative as well  as qualitative
analysis.
Consider first the  composition of inputs  into the  farm production
process:  Land, labor, equipment, and financial  capital.  One of the most
useful definitions uses  the  term "a family farm"  to  describe  an enterprise
in which the major fraction of control  over the most durable  of these
inputs,  land and labor,  is  exercised or contributed by a family unit.  A
conventional  estimate  in  the agricultural economics literature  is  that a
farming family will  contribute annually approximately 1.6 man-year
equivalents of labor.  Using  this base, a farming unit could be classified
as  a family farm if total  annual  labor use did not greatly exceed 3 man-
years.  Note  that this definition does  not preclude use of a significant
quantity of hired labor.
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control, though not necessarily ownership,  of the  land used in production
rests with the  farming family.  Note  that this  does not preclude  control
through renting or leasing, nor  does  it exclude a corporate  form of farm
business organization,  if the majority of the corporate equity is
controlled by the  farm family.
Using these definitions,  a family farm could be  incorporated, operate
entirely on rented land, and hire up to roughly 1.5 man-years of non-
family  labor.  It  could also operate entirely with some combination of
rented machinery and equipment coupled with contracts  for the performance
of specific farm operations  (most frequently, combine harvesting).
The current farm financial crisis has generated additional
definitions, based on the control  of financial capital.  Chapter 12  of the
recently amended Federal Bankruptcy Law, for  example, defines a family
farm as  one  in which 80 percent of the debt must arise out of farming
operations,  and more than 50 percent of the gross  income must come from
farming.
The emphasis  in  these definitions rests on control.  One measure of
the growing complexity of farming operations  is  the  fact that control by a
farm family does not necessarily imply ownership.  In an older generation,
in which the  institutional forms  of farm business organization were
limited, this  control was achieved through outright ownership.  This is
still a prominent feature of many types of farming, especially field crop
production, but the  separation of control  through ownership and control
through contractual  arrangements  is  rapidly expanding.
2The most emphatic evidence of this shift from ownership to
contractual control can be seen in  the expansion of farm units classified
by the U.S. Census  of Agriculture as  "part-owner" farms.  From 1950  to
1986 the  average  size of farm in  the United States more than doubled, from
215 acres to  455 acres.  Most of this  increase was  accomplished by farm
land owners who expanded their size of operation by adding rented land to
land already owned.
While  there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of farm land
operated under lease or rental arrangements by part-owners,  there has  at
the  same time been remarkable stability in the proportion of total acres
of  rented land to  the acres of land in farms.  U.S.  Census of Agriculture
data for 1945  reported 37.8 percent of all acres  in farms as  tenant
operated (either by full tenants  or part-owners).  The figure was  37.3
percent in 1969,  39.6 percent in 1978  and 38.9 percent in 1982.  The major
shift  that occurred was a drop  in the percentage operated by full  tenants,
from 22.1 percent in 1945  to  11.5 percent  in 1982.  Rented land operated
by part owners  increased from 15.7 percent in 1945 to  24.4 percent in 1969
and to  27.4 percent in  1982  (DeBraal and Wunderlich, 1983, p. 49).
These changes have resulted in a massive restructuring of farm equity
but with little change  in the proportion of farm land rented.  The typical
U.S.  farmer in 1982 was a part-owner.  Part-owners  in 1982  owned 26.4
percent of all farm land and rented an additional 27.4 percent,  for a
total of 53.8 percent of all  land in farms.  When combined with the  34.7
percent  of farm land held by full owners,  the result was  that 88.5 percent
of all land in farms  in 1982 was  in the hands of operators who owned some
3or  all of the land they farmed.  This  is  the highest proportion  in this
century.
The rental market emerges as  the major instrument by which  farm size
expansion and equity sharing are being accomplished in U.S.  agriculture.
Heirs leaving the farm have typically retained ownership of their fraction
of the land, and rented it to neighbors or to siblings.  This  is  one of
the major ways  in which farm size expansion has been achieved.
The term "family farm" was once interpreted to  imply ownership  of all
the  land farmed.  This  is no  longer a tenable definition.  But farming
families still retain control  over the majority of the land in
agricultural use  in  the United States,  although the nature of that control
has  changed.  It is  instructive  to examine  the possible reasons why family
units have proved to be a durable  form of business organization in
farming.
Perhaps  the most important  fact is  that decisions  involving a trade-
off between consumption and investment are  internalized within the farm
firm.  A decision to raise wages  or increase family expenditure  on
consumption is  immediately confronted with the  fact that less will be
available for investment.  A decision to  restrict consumption, i.e.  to
accept a lower wage,  in order to  increase investment  occurs  in a framework
that unifies decisions affecting both income and wealth.  The possibility
of future returns  from slow pay-out  investments can be valued more highly
by the work-force  if it  is  also the direct beneficiary of future capital
gains.  The family unit in farming can make  a direct trade-off that
translates  lower labor  income into prospects for a higher net worth.  When
wage recipients  are not also capital providers this  trade-off cannot be
4made.  This  is  especially important in agriculture,  dealing as  it does
with biological processes and climatic cycles  in which time  is  the
critical variable.  The family farming unit  can place a higher value on
the future.
A second reason is  that  the reward and penalty structure affecting
managerial decisions  is  symmetrical.  Those  accepting risk are  the ones
who will benefit or suffer, depending on the outcome.  This  feature  is
especially important  in those  types  of enterprises  in which conventional
economic risks associated with prices  and markets are combined with
climatic risk.  The  riskiness of farming sets  it  apart  from most other
types of business.  This has  discouraged cumbersome  forms  of business
organization that rely on repetitive processes and institutionalized
behavior rules.  Together with forestry and fishing, farming is  almost the
only type of business  in which the operator must decide  anew each morning
what work to  attempt in that day.  This puts a premium on the  ability to
make quick and risky decisions.
This attribute of a risk-accepting family managerial unit  in farming
is  closely related to  a third characteristic,  in  that  the  information
feed-back loop  in day-to-day operations  is  unbroken.  When something goes
wrong, the  individual who detects  it  is  also  the one who must correct it.
There need be no delay  in reporting the malfunction to a supervisor, with
an accompanying wait for authority to  take  remedial action.  On-site
decisions  are frequently required that cannot easily be centralized, or
accommodated  in an operating manual.  The potential advantages of job
specialization  in farming are  in many cases  outweighed by diseconomies of
size  in decision making.  Coping with the unexpected is  achieved most
5efficiently when the functions  of worker, manager, and capital provider
are  combined in the  same individual  or family.
The embodiment of the functions  of worker, manager, and capitalist  in
a family unit also creates  a fourth advantage  of a family-type business
unit, in that  the family  in control can place a higher value on non-
monetary rewards than is possible when these functions are separated.
These rewards  include independence  of decision-making, a relative  freedom
from supervisory control, social status in  the community, a self-image
that  is  rooted in a sense of self-mastery, and a freedom to determine  the
pace  of work.  Although these characteristics  of a job are not priced
directly in a market place, it  is  clear that they have monetary value.
Other things being equal, workers will accept lower monetary wages when
the  conditions of work include the above  features.  This  option is
available to  the family unit  in farming, and is  a major explanation for
the  fact  that labor income in farming has persistently  stayed below
nominal wage levels  in comparable non-farm jobs.  The farming family can
convert what would in a non-farm job be considered leisure time  into  low-
wage employment, and  is perfectly rational  in so  doing.
A feature  of family-scale  firms  in farming that has  grown in
significance  in recent decades  is  their ability to  fail  at a relatively
low social cost.  The characteristic of large business firms  in non-farm
production that has emerged most dramatically since  the second World War
is  their ability to postpone change until  it  is  forced upon them.  When
change does come,  it tends  to  be catastrophic, and to  involve very high
social costs,  including sudden and massive unemployment, community
disruption, and the  traumatic write-down of capital values, private,
6corporate, and public.  In some well-publicized cases  (Lockheed, Chrysler)
the  costs of failure  threatened to be so  large that the  firms were not
permitted to fail.  Change has not been incremental.
The  sorting-out process  in business management that enables  failure
to be a part of learning has been a major characteristic  of family-type
farming in the United States.  This  is  its most prominent dimension, in
the  financial  crisis that  is currently dominating American agriculture.
Reductions in the number of farm firms  and the consequent collapse of many
rural communities  threaten to create  farming ghost towns  of a type  once
thought to be found only  in mining regions.  There have been disruptions
in rural community cohesion and wipe-outs of capital values on an
unprecedented scale.  The social cost of this change  is  enormous,  and
often unnecessarily high.  But we  should be clear about  its significance
in a larger setting.
Technological change  in agriculture has not been inhibited by farms
so  large that they could avoid it.  Wage costs  in farming have not been
elevated by firms with the market power to pass  on a higher wage bill to
consumers through higher prices.  More  than all  of the increase  in the
real cost of food in the United States in  the past half-century is
explained by the addition of processing, packaging, and distribution
services.  The real  cost of food products at  the  farmgate has  steadily
declined.  The structure  of relatively small to medium-sized farms  under
predominantly family control has enabled incremental  change  in agriculture
to  occur at a pace unmatched in other industries.
7This  is  demonstrated in Table  1, which shows an annual  rate of labor
productivity growth in  farming which, at 6 percent per year,  is more  than
twice as high as the growth rates achieved in manufacturing or  in service-
producing sectors,  for  the period from 1948  to  1981.  For the past half-
century, farming in the United States has been in the  forefront of
technological change.
There are other attributes  of a structure of family  type  firms in
agriculture  that are  less easily quantified.  The growth of large
agribusiness  firms  in some sectors of agriculture has  introduced rural
communities  to  labor problems that exceed any previous experience.
Strikes, boycotts,  and tension between labor and management have not
historically been a part of the  farming scene.  They are today,  in some
sectors of vegetable, horticultural, and tree-crop production.  The rise
of contract production in poultry and eggs  introduces  the  prospect of
labor strife  in  this  sector, and this possibility is more distant but
visible in some  types of hog and beef cattle  feeding.
This throws  in sharp relief the fact that farm structures dominated
by family-type units have been remarkably free of  internal conflict
arising out of labor relations.  There have been few instances  of
jurisdictional strikes  in agriculture.  Crafts and skills have rarely been
a basis  for labor specialization.  Conflict between younger and older
workers has been resolved within families.  There has been little evidence
of forced retirement to  make way for younger and cheaper workers.
One of the most important of  the intangible  attributes  of family
farms is  the combination of job-related learning experiences with training
in management and risk-taking.  The worker-managed firm has been a
8Table 1
Estimated Trend  Labor Productivity Growth By
Sectors in the United States
1948-1981/
Private Business  Average Annual Trend
Sectors  Productivity Growthb/
1948-68  1968-81
(% per year)
Service Producing  3.0  1.5
Goods Producing  3.0  2.1
Manufacturing  2.9  2.8
Farming  6.0  6.3
Private Business
Sector as  a Whole  3.3  1.8
a/  Charles S. Morris,  "The Productivity  'Slowdown':  A Sectoral
Analyses", Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, April 1984, p. 13.
b/  Trend productivity growth  is defined as  the growth in  output
per manhour worked if all resources in the  economy were fully
employed at desired levels  (Morris, p. 4).
9reality, not a slogan, in family farming.  Where the  size of farm has been
big enough to permit experimentation, with its attendant risks, an optimum
business climate has been created for  the rapid adoption of new
technology.  A structure  of medium-sized and larger family farms has been
associated with a record-breaking pace of technological change.  Something
must have been working right.
If  these have been the  strong points of a family-farm structure, what
are  the handicaps?  Is  this  system threatened?  The first point  to make  is
that there are no simple answers  to the  questions.  In a broad sense,  the
very strengths of the  system have  also contained seeds of decay.  The  most
prominent example from the past two decades has been the  susceptibility of
land owners  to  the lure  of capital  gains.  Growing publicity given to
world population growth and food shortages  in  the  1960's exploded  in the
early 1970's  into a belief that  the world was running out of ability to
feed itself.  American farmers were  told repeatedly  that they possessed
the world's largest reserve of food-producing capacity.  It was an easy
step  to  the conclusion that farm land values could only rise, and this was
borne out by four decades of almost continuously rising land values, from
1935  to  1981.
Those who owned farm land were transformed from profit-seekers  into
rent-seekers.  Appreciation in land values overrode mistakes  in farm
management.  After the mid-1970's  income stagnated in real terms,  while
land values continued to rise.  The credit base created by higher land
values encouraged borrowing on a scale that was not supported by cash
flow.  Farmers  in general,  and above all family farmers who owned land,
proved to be  exceptionally exposed to the  lures  of inflation.
10The cultural values of family farmers increased the danger of this
exposure.  An almost universal goal  of family  farmers has been to pass  the
farm on within the  family.  Helping a son get started in  farming has been
the highest expression of this  goal.  In this context, demographic  trends
created a trap.
For  the U.S. as  a whole, the  foundation for  the baby boom was  laid in
the  12  years from 1945  to  1957.  In that period annual births  increased
from 2.85 million to over 4.3 million, and remained above 4.0 million from
1954 to  1964.  As  a result,  the population of young adults  reaching age  21
reached its maximum in 1978, which can also be  taken as  the mid-point of
the euphoria that fueled the boom in land prices  after 1972-73.
The  land boom of the  1970's was thus perfectly synchronized with the
baby boom that maximized the number of young people reaching an age when
they were ready to make career  choices.  In retrospect, the  results were
predictable.  With rising land prices  and a peak in  the youth population,
families were presented with an irresistible temptation to use  their
expanded credit base to help establish their young people in  farming.  The
most vulnerable  families were those who had inherited land, or purchased
it at the relatively low prices that prevailed from the mid-1930's through
the 1960's.  In short, the  families with the  largest credit base with
which to help their youth make a start in farming were those that
represented a tradition of family farming, often extending back over
several generations.
There was a high degree of interaction among these variables.
Families with a strong credit base could make  the highest bids  for  farm
land  that came onto  the market, thus  fueling  the  inflation in land prices.
11When land prices collapsed after 1981-82,  these families were the  ones
most affected.  This  explains  the  frequency with which farming failures
and bankruptcies  in the  1980s have  seemed to  involve an unusual number of
farms that had been held by the same  families  for generations.  They were
often the ones whose transient  credit base  lured them into highly unwise
land purchase decisions.
The demographic  trap was only one of the  roots  of the farm financial
crisis of the  1980's.  The nature of technological  change  in agriculture
since  1950 has  involved the use of credit on a scale that makes  farming
exceptionally sensitive  to  interest rates.
At the end of the  Second World War labor was just under one half of
the  total cost of farm  inputs  in U.S. agriculture.  Land accounted for  16
percent, all purchased inputs  (machinery,  agricultural chemicals,  feeds,
seeds, and purchased livestock)  for  26 percent, and interest and taxes  7
percent.  By  1985 the  cost of labor inputs had fallen to  19  percent of
total costs, land had risen to  23 percent, and the  total  of all purchased
inputs involved 52  percent of total  input cost  (USDA, 1986).
In this 40-year period the fraction of total  costs  represented by
purchased inputs doubled.  This has more  than doubled the exposure of
agriculture to  the costs of production credit.  An older generation could
absorb economic shock by suppressing family  levels of living,  i.e.  by
accepting a lower wage.  When labor costs were half of total  costs,  this
represented a major shock-absorbing capacity.  Today, with labor costs
under  20 percent and purchased inputs over 50 percent of total  input cost,
this  shock-absorbing capacity has been undermined.  At the  same time,  the
rise  in purchased inputs has greatly increased the  exposure of farmers  to
12interest rate  fluctuations.  Since  1945 the  capacity of the  financial
system to  generate interest-rate shock in  the farming sector has been more
than doubled, and the  capacity of farm families to  absorb it has been more
than cut in half.
The  consequent financial  stress on the  farming sector has assumed
unexpected proportions in  the 19 80's.  A decision to  accelerate military
expenditures  after 1980 has  lifted them to levels of GNP previously
unknown except  in wartime.  No comparable offsetting cuts  in  federal non-
military expenditures proved to be possible.  A large  and growing federal
budget deficit resulted, and  this had to  be covered by borrowing.  High
real  interest rates  have been necessary to attract  the needed funds.  This
led to  a demand for dollars by foreign investors anxious  to benefit  from
the higher interest  rates, and thus to  a sharp  increase in  the exchange
rate of the  dollar.
In this way U.S. exports were made  increasingly high priced to
foreign buyers and imports were progressively cheaper.  Agricultural
exports after  1981 were prominent victims of the resulting drop  in U.S.
export trade, caused primarily by defective federal  fiscal and financial
policies.
Both the  trade deficit and high interest rates can be viewed as  the
effects of a policy of financing a federal budget deficit by borrowing.
This has thrown the burden disproportionately on those sectors  of the
economy that depend heavily on credit. Farming has emerged as a high
credit-using sector, without  the ability to pass  on credit costs  to
consumers  in the  form of higher prices.  The transition to a high
dependence on purchased inputs,  and thus  on production credit, has been
13especially traumatic  for family farms.  Since 1980  they have been
increasingly at  the mercy of national and international  trends  in
financial markets, and have  lost much of their capacity  to  respond by
cutting back on family consumption.  A family farm structure dependent on
purchased inputs  is  highly vulnerable  in the economic world of today.
The effects of structural  change that were primarily internal  to
agriculture were accelerated in the  inflation of the  1970's.  Repeated
efforts  at  the national level had been made  to help  farmers by
preferential treatment under the  income  tax.  Costs  of land clearing and
conservation practices could be  "expensed", within limits,  i.e.  could be
deducted as  annual  operating costs.  Cash-basis rather than accrual
accounting had long been authorized for farmers,  even  for  those whose
scale  of operation would have required accrual  accounting for income tax
purposes if  they.had been in any business other  than farming.  Tax rulings
in the  1970's permitted farmers  to  treat  single-purpose buildings used in
livestock and poultry or horticultural production as  if they were
machinery or equipment, with consequent reductions  in  the length  of time
over which they could be depreciated.  This  greatly reduced the cost of
the  investment to high-income tax-payers.
Other investment  incentives built into  the  tax code were not designed
explicitly with farmers  in mind, but had a significant effect on the
competitive  status of farmers  in different  income size classes.  The most
pervasive was  the  investment  tax credit, originally 7 percent and later
raised to  10 percent.  This was  a straightforward  reduction in  the price
of machinery, equipment, and some types  of buildings  for  those taxpayers
who had a tax obligation large  enough to  absorb the credit.
14A similar effect resulted from accelerated depreciation schedules,
permitting a more  rapid write-off of depreciable property.  In the  land
boom of the  1970's,  one of the  most damaging concessions was  the
preferential taxation of capital gains.  The higher the  income tax  class
in which a taxpayer fell,  the  greater the value of these  tax-code rules.
The effect was  to  reduce  the cost of capital relative  to  labor,  to  reduce
the  real cost of investments  in farm operations by high income  taxpayers,
and to increase  the after-tax value  of any profit derived from the  sale  of
land.  A tremendous  incentive was created for  farm size  enlargement  and
for  the  substitution of capital  for  labor, in order to  reach  income  tax
brackets at which the value of tax rules could be maximized.
This incentive structure was further augmented by tax  rules
permitting the melding of farm and non-farm  income.  A high income  tax
obligation resulting from non-farm income could be reduced by investing in
a farm with its many opportunities  for expensing capital  improvements.
Current income could be converted into capital values, and if  sold, any
capital gain would be  taxed at a flat rate that was much lower than the
tax rate  on earned income.  At the time of enactment of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986  the maximum tax on capital gains was  20 percent  (one-half of 40-
percent of the gain) while  the top  rate  on earned income was  50 percent.
This created a powerful  reward system for high-income taxpayers who
invested in farming.  Similar attractions prevailed in forestry.
Inflation in the  1970s multiplied the force of these tax-based
incentives.  One consequence was  to put  the family type  farm at a
comparative disadvantage unless  the farm was  large  enough to  lift  the
farmer  into high income tax brackets.  Using the definitions with which
15this paper began (a labor requirement of approximately 3 man-years  and
half or more of the  equity under farm family control),  it  is  clear that
most family  farms could not  achieve the  income  levels needed to take  full
advantage of income  tax-based incentives.  In effect, national income tax
policy down-graded all  types of proprietary businesses  of a family size,
and the most numerous business  firms  in this  category were farms.  One
rule emerges:  It has not been possible  to help family-type firms by tax
concessions within the framework of a progressive  income tax as
administered to date  in  the United States.
It  is  as yet unclear whether or not  the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will
remove the worst of these structural distortions.  The  investment  tax
credit is  gone,  depreciation schedules have been lengthened, and tax-loss
farming has been made less  attractive.  But many potential sources of
distortion still remain.  Achieving this  level of wisdom in  income tax
policy has been very expensive  for medium sized family farms.  If the  farm
is  small enough, family labor can be released for non-farm employment,
which can underwrite the  survival of the farm unit.  If  it  is  at  the upper
end of the  family farm size class,  the differential effects  of income tax
policy that favor  taxpayers in higher income brackets can be  reduced, if
not eliminated.  It is  the  farms in  the mid-range of family size that were
under greatest financial pressure  in the  1970's and that face  the most
uncertain future  in the  1980's.
One shibboleth should be set aside,  in appraising the future of
family farms.  A farm that can gainfully employ 3 man-years of labor  is
not significantly less efficient than its  larger neighbors.  There is
general agreement in the  agricultural economics literature  that most
16economies  of size can be achieved at  farm sizes  that can be operated by a
farm family.  Where this  is  not the case,  as  in  some  types  of
horticultural crop production or  livestock and poultry feeding, it
reflects a concentration of the production process in both time and space
that approaches  the characteristics  of industrial production in a factory
setting.  This process has expanded rapidly in the past three decades,  in
some agricultural sectors.
Size alone  is  not necessarily an indicator of greater efficiency in
resource use.  It  should be noted that the  types  of agricultural  production
that have moved beyond the  family size of firm tend to be concentrated  in
areas that benefit  from high levels of price distortion for  two  of the
major production inputs:  labor and water.  Modal types  of the  largest
farms,  dairy herds and livestock feedlots  in the U.S.  are concentrated in
the  Southwest, in  the southern Great  Plains, and in the  Gulf and Southern
Atlantic coastal areas.  They are able to  exploit water resources that  are
flagrantly underpriced (in the California and Arizona case),  or not priced
at all  (as  is  true of withdrawals  from the Ogallala aquifer in the
Southern Plains).  They have also been the principal beneficiaries  of the
depressed level of labor wages resulting from a massive  in-migration of
labor from Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia.
It is  not clear that the  regions and communities that include  the
largest  types of farms are capable of supporting a level of services  and
community infrastructure  that  is necessary for a stable economic
environment.  Almost universally, they are  in low-tax jurisdictions with
low levels of local public services.  It  is  not demonstrated that  the
communities  in which they are located can reproduce a labor force  that
17will continue  their present wage-cost advantage.  It is  equally unclear
that  the  labor force of existing large  farms will reproduce a generation
of managers  and risk-takers.
These reflections point up a dimension of a family-farm structure of
agriculture that  is  difficult to quantify but perhaps of decisive
importance.  Farms produce many things besides  crops and livestock.  Above
all,  they produce people.  The ultimate  test of a farm structure  lies  in
the quality of the people it produces, and in the  stability of  the
communities  they support.  Family-type farms,  by this  test,  have proved to
be  remarkably successful.  They are undergoing dramatic  change  in the
United States,  increasing in size and decreasing in numbers. Many of  the
reasons  for  this decline  are a consequence of public policies  that were
not designed to eliminate family-operated businesses  in farming, but they
have had that effect.  These policies  could be changed, especially those
that relate to  income taxation,  interest rates, exchanges  rates, and the
international competitiveness  of U.S.  agricultural exports.  These appear
to  be the most promising approaches  for public policies that genuinely
seek to  create  an economic climate that  is  hospitable to  family businesses
in farming.
18References
DeBraal, J. Peter and Gene Wunderlich, 1983:  Rents  and Rental Practices
in U.S. Agriculture, The Farm Foundation and Economic Research
Service, U.S.  Dept. of Agriculture.
Morris, Charles S.  "The Productivity  'Slowdown':  A Sectoral Analysis",
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, April 1984, p. 13.
U.S.  Dept. of Commerce,  1984:  Bureau of the Census,  1982 Census  of
Agriculture, United States Summary and State Data, Vol. 1, Part 51, Oct.  1984.
U.S.  Dept. of Agriculture, 1986:  Economic Research Service, revised input
expenditure estimates, personal communication, October 1986.
19